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ABSTRACT:
Privatization is the process of engaging the private
sector in whole or in part to provide services traditionally
provided by government. The process comes in two primary
forms: Load Shedding - representing the complete
disengagement by the public sector in the provision of
services; and contracting out - the more common form in which
government remains vitally involved, but only as a purchaser,
facilitator, and monitor, leaving actual provision of services
to the private sector.
The focus of this thesis is the potential for savings
related to real estate services in state owned courthouses in
Massachusetts by contracting out more with the real estate
industry. The Suffolk County Courthouse is used as a specific
example of a candidate for privatization in this form.
Subsequently, a comparison is made between the cost to operate
publicly managed courthouses in the Commonwealth and similar
privately managed buildings in the Boston area. The method of
Turnkey development is also looked at as a way to capture
private sector expertise to reduce the cost to procure new and
renovated courthouses.
The challenge of privatization is not to convince others
of its economic justification. Opposition comes from those
who believe the movement will reduce their well-being.
Successful privatization of Massachusetts courthouses, and of
other facilities, will ride on promoters' handling of
opposition.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas A. Steele
Title: Lecturer,








CHAPTER I: Components of a Competitive Environment
and the Public Role in Privatization..............
Efficiency...................................
Managing the Competitive Process.............
Scope Definition.............................
Competitive Environment......................
Performance Measures and Accountability......
Public Role in Privatization.........
Appearance of Privatization..
Agency Mission over Survival.
Increase Talent/Decrease Size
CHAPTER II: Court Operating Costs,

























Private Property Management for Courtho
CHAPTER III: Increasing Privatization of Capital




Limits of Turnkey: No Ownership Incentive..
Dealing with Scope Risk....................























The Old Suffolk County Courthouse is a beautiful historic
building set on top of Beacon Hill next to the Old State House
in Boston. It is a proud Victorian structure with grey
granite facades and a slate mansard roof trimmed in copper.
Upon entering, a visitor is drawn to a large central open
space with a vaulted ceiling four stories up and balconies all
around. Interior finish materials are mostly stone with
murals painted on plaster ceilings above. The building's
features project its identity and one senses the tradition of
Boston just by being there.
Sadly, the fortress like structure is in a depressing
state of repair: the murals are peeling, evidence of water
leaks are everywhere, and exposed wiring runs throughout its
corridors. For the first time visitor, one wonders how it got
this way.
A quick look at the state's fiscal condition is one clue;
revenues have not met expenses for over four years causing
capital intensive projects like a major courthouse renovation
to be postponed. Another contributing factor might be state
management of the courthouse. The Boston Globe has published
numerous articles attempting to illustrate the "mismanagement
of the Massachusetts court system." 1 Alleged moonlighting
by court officers and a lax review of the Globe's allegations
by a court administrator has caused many to concur with the
newpaper's view that "the entire system of justice will
continue to be supervised ineptly." 2
William Weld was elected Governor on a platform promoting
more dependence on the private sector to deliver public
services and downsizing of government. His mission was
carried by state Treasure Joseph Malone to the threshold of
the Hynes Convention Center, a publicly run facility that has
lost money since its inception. After a thorough review of
the managing agency, Malone decided to give the Hynes
executive director another year to "demonstrate improvement in
managing the agency, in improving customer service, and in
reducing skyrocketing employee overtime" before deciding to
replace the agency with private management. 3
Some advocates will contend the threat of privatization
can do as much as privatization itself to cut costs and
promote competition and efficiency. Others argue that
privatization is totally counter-productive. One union
president was recently quoted in the Globe while commenting on
the Governor's policies: "Weld's privatization plan is like a
1 Kirk Scharfenberg, ed. , "The Courthouse Go-Around, " Boston
Globe, 18 July 1991.
2 Ibid.
Peter J. Howe, "Malone Gives Hynes a Year to Improve,"
Boston Globe, 18 July 1991.
runaway train filled with people that has just pulled out of
the station without a driver, without breaks, and its going at
a tremendous speed." 4
These contemporary anecdotes set the stage for the
following privatization discussion. It is a topic debated
compassionately from both sides because its affects are far-
reaching in a politically oriented state like Massachusetts.
Although the tangible benefits of privatization may seem
incremental, the movement represents a major transformation of
the role of government. Successful privatization will mean a
substantial reduction in the size of the public sector. But
this reduction should not imply a reduction in capability.
Indeed, if government is to successfully manage the process of
engaging the public sector to deliver more services, the
capacity of its executives must increase.
Many privatization advocates rave about the potential
elimination of government from service provision altogether
and the benefits that will accrue from less government
spending. In reality, the opportunities for complete
disengagement, or "load shedding," are limited. This thesis
does not presume that courthouses of the Commonwealth can be
"sold off" to the private sector as though court facilities of
the future could be a competitively leased commodity.
Courthouses are unique structures that would lend themselves
Teresa M. Hanafin, "Suit to Charge Private Rehire of State
Health Staff is Illegal," Boston Globe, 18 July 1991.
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more to the tendencies of monopoly than competition if sold.
Furthermore, courts will continue to require financial support
from the state. They are not.major toll roads or high speed
rails to be wholly supported by user fees.
For these reasons, contracting out is the most realistic
form of privatization of state courthouses like Suffolk
County. Although this may seem the more traditional approach,
it implies an intensification of public capacity with respect
to real estate management - in short, more punch in a smaller
package.
The Suffolk County Courthouse was chosen in particular as
medium for this discussion because it serves a symbolic
purpose; its condition is depressing, it has been under-funded
by a system that promotes deferred maintenance and
subsequently avoidable capital improvement expenses, and its
management is suspect. Privatization at this courthouse, in
the form of contracting for more real estate services from
design conception through property management, would represent
a new direction for the state - a new attitude of dependence
on business and industry to provide services that are only
regulated, monitored, and funded by government.
PRIVATIZATION FOCAL POINTS:
With state courts, the private sector is already depended
upon for many real estate services; new construction,
renovation, design, and much maintenance is already done under
contract. But the system could go further. The following
areas offer privatization potential in that the state could do
more to push contracting deeper into the private sector to
gain the efficiencies of competition.
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT:
The Office of the Chief Administrative Justice, the
office ultimately managing the judiciary's buildings, oversees
contracts for a substantial portion of required services like
elevator maintenance and equipment repair. Other property
management functions such as security, janitorial service, and
purchasing are kept in-house and conducted by state and county
employees. 5 A comparison will be made between the cost of
keeping such services in-house and contracting out to
competing entities.
FACILITY PROCUREMENT:
Like a traditional owner, the state generally keeps full
control over the selection of architects and contractors.
There has been experimentation with design/ build, fast-track,
and modular construction with prisons and higher education
For the state buildings analyzed, on site management is
provided by the counties. At the end of each fiscal year county
managers submit operating costs to the Office of the Chief
Administrative Justice for reimbursement on "Schedules of Cost
to Service Courthouse Facilities." These schedules provided
operating cost data for this report.
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facilities which have reduced construction schedules
dramatically, and brought national attention to the state's
progressive procurement abilities. Chapter III discusses
turnkey development as a natural progression of the state's
capacity to capitalize on private sector expertise. With this
method competing developers are sought out to provide complete
proposals covering design, construction, financing, property
management, and overall package coordination.
THE PUBLIC ROLE:
The inevitable contraction of government through
privatization will be neither pleasant nor painless, but it
must take place if government is to take advantage of private
sector efficiency. But to simply reduce the size of
government, without redefining the roles, expectations, and
support of those who remain would probably result in a less
efficient and more expensive public sector than that which
exists today. To upgrade the calibre of the public sector
while reducing its size is a more far reaching, productive,
and thorough transition than many privatization advocates
realize. 6
6 Former DCPO Commissioner, John I. Carlson, Jr. originally
brought this issue to my attention and emphasized it in several
interviews throughout the course of research.
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CHAPTER I:
COMPONENTS OF A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PUBLIC ROLE IN
PRIVATIZATION
A central theme in the privatization movement is that
taxpayers will get the most value from their tax dollars by
contracting out public services. Fundamentally, any entities
seeking the right to produce government services for a fee,
including public sector service providers, should compete for
that right. Competition is not new to the public sector; the
federal government has required that many services be
contracted out since the Federal Property Administration
Services Act of 1949. Additionally, state government in
Massachusetts has contracted out many design, engineering,
construction, and maintenance services for decades. This
chapter focuses on the essential elements of competitive
contracting and suggests a realignment of the state's role in
the contracting process.
EFFICIENCY: A RESULT OF PROFIT SEEKING MANAGEMENT
Any efficiencies to be gained through contracting out
come from the consolidated ownership structure of the private
sector. It is the ownership framework, not the people, that
Most privatization authors emphasize consolidated
ownership in the private sector. In particular, Stuart M.
Butler, Privatizing Federal Spending (New York: Universe Books,
11
promotes efficiency through the potential for profit. John D.
Donahue discusses the elements of efficiency in The
Privatization Decision:
When those who control the productive organization are
owners (or strictly answerable to owners), the exercise
of ownership rights will tend to limit random
inefficiency... This tendency of profit-seeking
organizations holds true.. .whet ier or not contracts are
competitive and well enforced.
This pressure to minimize cost and maximize profit inspired by
ownership consolidation is the principal element that can
result in cost savings to the taxpayer. In Donahue's terms
"there is no truly equivalent function in a public
bureaucracy, no link in the chain of agency relationships
where incentives and authority to press for efficiency are
quite so potently concentrated." 9
In the public sector, ownership is diluted and
intangible. Ultimately, taxpayers pay for government services
and are the beneficiaries of reduced costs. Technically, they
have an ownership interest, but continual taxpayer pressure of
government agencies to reduce cost is unlikely because
benefits are so remote for the majority of taxpayers. The
distance between the citizen funding the service and the civil
1985), p. 64.
8 John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision (New York:
Basic Books, 1989), p. 90.
Ibid.
servant delivering it is too great and the cost born by each
taxpayer too small.
Any natural association of the private owner and the
concept of efficiency, however, must be cautioned; first,
large "bureaucratic" private enterprises can lose the intense
pressure for efficiency between principals and managers just
like government. 10 Second, profit seekers will consider use
of any revenue that increases cost as undesirable.
Subsequently, the social goals often promoted instinctively by
government agencies are not necessarily on the profit seeker's
agenda. Finally, as Donahue implies in the referenced
quotation, well managed profit seekers will pursue cost
efficiencies whether or not the contract is well administered
and monitored by government. If government is successful in
bridling private sector incentives, either low cost of service
or high quality will result. If not, efficiency will remain
high along with cost to government and profit to
contractors.12
MANAGING THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS:
Simply requiring that government call on the private
sector to produce public services is no guarantee of cost




how government agencies promote, regulate, and manage
competition. 13
Establishing such an environment in which true
competition can take place is a more challenging task than
most realize. The three key components needed to minimize the
cost of government services are (i) a clear and concise
definition of scope - exactly what the government wishes to
buy, (ii) the existence of a competitive environment - one in
which numerous equally qualified entities are capable of and
eager to provide the defined service, and (iii), a system of
measures of accountability - performance standards to which
the competitive entity realizes it will be compared and made
accountable on a periodic basis. 14 Building and maintaining
this environment should be the role of government with regard
to its real property needs.
SCOPE DEFINITION:
In order to capitalize on a competitive environment, a
definition of the scope of work or the product to be purchased
is essential. If the product or process is constantly changing
it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce a clear
definition of exactly what is to be produced by competitors.
If the product or process is definable and the results of the
13 E. S. Savas, Privatization (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham
Publishers, 1987), pp. 64-66.
14 Ibid.
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process measurable, it becomes possible to solicit competitive
proposals to provide exactly what is called for.
Donahue offers as excellent example of competitive,
quantifiable relationships and non-competitive relationships.
In The Privatization Decision he contrasts the public tasks
of getting the White House painted and providing personal
protection for the President.
The building manager responsible for the paint finish on
the White House simply wants a high quality finish on the
President's residence. He is not interested in how the
painter applies the finish, scaffolds the building, whether he
hires union or nonunion, or how many days off are given to
workers. He simply defines the type of paint he wants, the
number of coats, the color, then establishes a contract
duration, and invites competition from profit seekers.
Conversely, simply stating that "the President is to be
protected by whatever means necessary" could be a very risky
form of contracting. Leaving the means of Presidential
protection up to an imaginative profit seeking contractor
would allow for many questionable tactics. With this
government function, Donahue points out that it makes sense to
set up a government run organization, with established rules
and methods of procedure routinely applied by civil servants.
In summation, if government is to attract and benefit
from private service providers it must be able to define
exactly what is needed. If scope definition is not possible,
few benefits will accrue from privatization through
contracting out.
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT:
The second important element in successful contracting of
government services is in managing the competitive
environment. In selecting from a group of competitive
proposals, government must have the ability to determine which
providers are most qualified to provide the specified service.
If service providers cannot be effectively qualified prior to
competing for contracts, government can end up with either an
under-qualified contractor not capable of completing the work,
or an over-qualified contractor (less common) not particularly
interested in a relatively "minor" contract. In either event,
government can ultimately pay more than is necessary to
resolve problems that would otherwise not arise were service
providers pre-qualified. 15
Exact standards for qualification of contractors are
difficult to pinpoint as projects and services very
infinitely. Follow-up on experience levels and reference
checking from client lists is usually the central focus of
pre-qualification, while the ultimate objective is to
establish a very competitive group of contractors equally
15 Pre-qualification and contractor certification are
essential and formal parts of DCPO's management of competitors.
John I. Carlson, Jr. described the process during an interview.
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qualified to execute the specific project at hand, all bidding
on a well defined scope of work.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
The final determinant of cost efficiency gained through
contracting out is the government's ability to measure and
evaluate the performance of the contractor on a periodic basis
and replace him/her if necessary, with minimal transition
costs. 16 If a contractor competes for a project or service
contract and then cannot be measured in terms of performance
or quality, government will fail to capitalize on competitive
efficiencies. If product quality is allowed to deteriorate
unaccountably, costs will fall for the well managed producer,
profits will skyrocket, and savings will not be passed on to
the public.
In addition to accountability measures, the public agency
must have the ability to remove the contracting party if
necessary with minimal costs to initiate another contractor to
the product or process. If a contractor knows the public
entity will have difficulty in replacing him/her, there is
less incentive to maintain product or service quality. 17
16 Transition costs associated with relocating service
provision from public to private sector are one of many hidden
costs described by Robert W. Bailey, "Uses and Misuses of
Privatization" in Steven H. Hanke, ed., Prospects for
Privatization (New York: Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science, 1987), p. 149.
17 Carlson interview.
Furthermore, if the agency does not pay attention to the
contractor's operations, it will spend significant sums in
learning the contractor's means and methods of product
delivery during the replacement process. It is essential,
then, that government constantly monitor contract performance
to both keep tabs on the quality of service and keep up to
date on innovative industry techniques and practice.
PUBLIC ROLE IN PRIVATIZATION:
Successful privatization of more real estate services for
the courts will depend on how well the Office of the Chief
Administrative Justice and the Department of Capital Planning
and Operations (DCPO) can handle the core essentials outlined
above. 18 In addition to managing scope, competition, and
accountability, three other factors are pertinent to the
public role in privatization through contracting: the public
appearance of the contract process, the simultaneous
development of public managerial talent with reduction in the
size of government, and the prioritizing of agency mission
over agency existence. 19
APPEARANCE OF PRIVATIZATION:
In the contrast illustrated by Donahue of selecting a
White House painter and body guards for the President, he
18 See Appendix A for an explanation of the DCPO/State
Agency relationship.
19 Carlson interview.
implies that government attention and involvement can be
decreased when delivery means are less important than results.
Clearly, there is merit in removing paint brushes from the
hands of federal workers, but the process and means of
providing services for taxpayers will still be important even
as public employee participation decreases. 20
In contracting out construction services for the state,
DCPO pays particular attention to both the product it wishes
to purchase and the process by which providers of products are
selected. Former DCPO Commissioner, John I. Carlson, Jr.
stresses the importance of the process of contracting because
"anything we do must appear beyond repute." Because DCPO was
a product of the Ward Commission of 1980, an investigation
into graft and corruption in the former Bureau of Building
Construction, extra attention and care are given to proper
appearance and propriety in every phase of proposal
solicitation, review, contract award, and administration. As
more services are turned over to private entities through
privatization, and fewer public sector managers handle greater
dollar volumes, the potential for corruption and graft can
increase. Subsequently, executives will have to demonstrate
an even greater resilience to tendencies of the past.
19
20 Ibid.
AGENCY MISSION OVER SURVIVAL:
Sentinel privatization author Stuart M. Butler premises
much of his argument for load shedding in Privatizing Federal
Spending on the fact that as long as government has any role
in service provision, there will continue to be pressure for
increased spending. With the courts, load shedding is not a
realistic scenario as described previously. Subsequently, one
can assume traditional political pressure for spending will
continue irrespective of employment concentration in either
sector. The question is how to resist this natural tendency.
Fortunately, there are examples in Massachusetts where
this bureaucratic rule of self-preservation does not apply.
DCPO has demonstrated the ability to take on a capital
improvement mission from the state legislature, build up its
capacity to execute the mission, then downsize and disband
upon completion of its task. This trait has been demonstrated
by its inter agency Corrections Unit which carried out the
Governor's mandate to solve the prison bed shortage in the
late eighties. The Corrections Unit increased personnel from
o to 60 between 1986 and 1989, oversaw design and construction
of new facilities, and has recently downsized to 15 persons
and been absorbed into another department within DCPO. The
Courts Unit, another DCPO inter agency group, is in the
process of executing its court capital improvement program and
will eventually downsize when its more long term mission is
complete. Through sound leadership and public service
20
commitment, DCPO has demonstrated its ability to value mission
over bureaucratic self-preservation. This characteristic
exemplifies public sector agencies prepared for privatization.
INCREASE TALENT/DECREASE SIZE:
In order to meet the challenges of privatization through
contracting out, the state would be well served to strengthen
its ranks with more highly qualified facilitators of services.
In a powerful article called "Public Management of
Privatization," Ronald C. Moe referenced a quote by Terry
Culler, a former Associate Director of the Office of Personnel
Management during the Reagan administration, sating that [the
government] "should be content to hire competent people, not
the best and most talented people.. .we should only seek a
sufficient work force to perform routine tasks [and that] the
best and the brightest ought to be steered to the private
sector where the national wealth is really created." 21 Moe
hardly agreed with Culler's argument, but he did note an
exodus of top talent from the public sector recently. Most
are attracted to better salaries and working conditions in the
private sector. As the size of government changes, addressing
these issues with the right managers might be a prudent agenda
item. Certainly, if government is to handle the challenge of
21 Ronald C. Moe, "Public Management of Privatization,"
Privatization Review, Summer 1989.
21
managing private sector relationships, more capable and
aggressive personnel will be a prerequisite. 22
At the opposite end of the equation are public sector
employees threatened by privatization. Clearly, the process
of contracting out results in a reduced need for civil
servants. A critical part of the process must be management
of this transition. Several methods have been implemented
including requiring the successful contractor to give first
refusal to public employees for new jobs under a contract,
allowing public employees to form a separate company and bid
for contracts, and instituting a "no layoff" policy. 23
Debatably, this transition is the most challenging and
difficult obstacle in the process, but the most fundamental
component of cost savings to the taxpayer. To the civil
servant's benefit, privatization does not necessarily mean an
elimination of jobs altogether from the economy. As
government turns to privatization through contracting, new
jobs are created in the private sector. The jobs that are
permanently eliminated should be those that represent
inefficiency and unnecessary cost to the taxpayer. As painful
as this may be in the short term for some, the long run
22
Ibid.
23 These techniques were discussed with Michael Lipof,
private sector member of the newly created Asset Management
Board, the state's new entity to assist in redevelopment and
disposition of state assets.




COURT OPERATING COSTS, CONTRACTING OUT, AND PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS
The intent of this chapter is to compare public and
private sector operating costs and management techniques and
to project savings available to the taxpayer by privatizing
more of the property management function in state owned court
facilities. The belief is that contracting methods used by
private property managers can save taxpayer dollars by
encouraging more competition for public real estate services
and separating economic issues from the social and political
components of the public contracting process.
Originally, the medium for this comparison was a
collection of three state owned courthouses, a federally owned
courthouse, and a new privately owned and operated downtown
office building. State buildings were the Suffolk County
Courthouse in Boston, Middlesex Superior Court in East
Cambridge, and the Hampden County Hall of Justice in
Springfield. The federal building was the McCormack Federal
Court and Post Office and 250 Freemont Street 24 was the
private office building.
24 250 Freemont is a fictitious name. At the owner's
request, the building's identity will remain anonymous. Other
information has also been modified, but operating data is
actual.
24
Upon inspection of the five properties, the diversity in
building age, design, and function might lead one to question
the choices for comparison. Two are sixty to one hundred
years old (Suffolk County and McCormack) while 250 Freemont is
brand new. Naturally, building systems are dramatically
different, and not all buildings house court operations which
are characterized by heavy traffic from a variety of users.
There were three reasons for selecting this group for
analysis. First, it seemed important to acquire operating
data on the older Suffolk County Facility as a bench-mark from
which operating cost savings could be measured once the
building was renovated. Unfortunately, costs for the
courthouse were not made available. The Office of the Chief
Administrative Justice has been under public scrutiny for some
time and would not release operating data freely.
Consequently, assumptions must be made about potential savings
based on real costs gathered from other large court
facilities.
Second, the fact that Hampden and Middlesex county courts
were similar structures in many ways to 250 Freemont made
comparisons more meaningful and offered sound medium through
which to compare public and private sector property
management.
Finally, the varying quantities of work contracted out
between the buildings was significant. The county operated
properties have many in-house custodial crews, security
guards, painters, carpenters, and maintenance personnel, while
250 Freemont contracts out all of its cleaning, security, and
the less technical portions of its maintenance program.
To bolster the point that competitive contracting can
reduce cost, the federally owned and operated McCormack
Building was added as the fourth comparative property. It
offered the perspective of a public building in which almost
all services are purchased from the private sector. Although
the building is considered outdated by the General Services
Administration (GSA) its costs were significantly less than
those of the state which operates in more modern facilities.
In addition to the four buildings analyzed, statistics
from the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) are
included for comparative purposes. The data is taken from a
1990 BOMA survey of between 44 and 55 office buildings
(depending on the cost category) in Boston, averaging 230,000
SF and ranging in age anywhere from new to 102 years. The
BOMA survey supports the two conclusions that (i) more
contracting can lead to lower costs and (ii) the private
sector is spending less on facility operation.
The following table compares the varying amounts of in-
house payroll against goods and services contracted out or
purchased for all buildings:
26
TABLE I:
1990 Percentage of Annual Operating Cost






Hall of Just. 67% 33%
Note: See Appendix B for explanation of data assembly.
One final clarification in these comparisons is that 250
Freemont was chosen deliberately because its costs should be
higher. It is an image oriented building in which tenant
cleaning standards, for instance, are very high; elevator cabs
are vacuumed three times per day, finger prints are wiped off
telephones and file cabinets nightly, and ceiling diffuser
outlets and adjacent ceiling tiles are cleaned every six
months.
By selecting a private sector building with high
standards for comparison, particularly with regard to cleaning
services, the risk that differences in property management
scope unfairly favor the private sector should be minimized.
By deliberately selecting a private sector building with more
comprehensive tenant services, the point can be made
conservatively that competition for definable and quantifiable
services will result in a superior product at a much lower
cost per square foot than the state presently pays.
BUILDING SPECIFICS:
Middlesex Superior Court, State Owned
Completed in 1975, this building has 16 floors of
courtroom and support offices and three basement levels
totaling 484,660 sf. A state sponsored engineering survey in
1980 determined the building to have "modern systems design
and good equipment [that] result in [a] good overall ability
to maintain comfort in most areas and provide good electric,
elevator, and other building services." 25 The building is
state owned, but management is by Middlesex County employees.
Hampden County Hall of Justice, State Owned
Completed in 1976, this facility has five floors
totalling 226,863 sf. Building systems were also surveyed and
summarized in 1980 as "nearly new... well maintained with
adequate capacity... good provision for comfort control and
life safety." 26 Management of this facility is by Hampden
county employees.
25 Massachusetts, Report on Present and Future Space and
Building of the Judicial Branch, 1980, p. 126.
26 Ibid., p. 84.
28
The McCormack Building, Federally Owned
The McCormack Building is a much older facility, built in
1932, with 21 floors totalling 498,000 sf. The systems are so
outdated that GSA considers the building obsolete and has
already purchased land and selected an architect for a new
courthouse on a waterfront site in Boston.
250 Freemont Street, Privately Owned
250 Freemont was completed in 1989 and is a "state of the
art," investment grade office building. It has approximately
650,000 sf over 20 floors and was selected for comparison
purposes because its manager practices the principles of
successful contracting as outlined in Chapter I. With
operations nearly 90% contracted out, its costs represent a
reasonably close approximation of future costs to operate a
fully renovated, similar sized space such as the Suffolk
County Courthouse. In all probability, operating costs for
the renovated court will be less than those of 250 Freemont
Street given the more modest level of tenant service necessary
for a courthouse.
DATA OVERVIEW:
There are great dissimilarities in reporting methods
between the public and private sector. Consequently, it is
not possible to draw concrete conclusions about potential cost
savings on all operations. Operating costs reported by
29
Hampden and Middlesex Counties, for instance, are reported to
the state's Office of the Chief Administrative Justice for
reimbursement as lump sums which include several court
buildings. Therefore, the square foot costs for repairs and
maintenance are derived by dividing the total cost for all
county buildings by total county square footage. (See Appendix
C for more detail). Given that the level of general repair,
systems modernization, and wear and tear can vary drastically
across a county's court facilities, it would be dangerous to
process and interpret the costs reported by the counties too
aggressively in some categories. Since what is represented by
the data is not always clear, only probable conclusions can be
drawn.
In other categories, the information is clear enough to
draw at least one conclusion: potential savings could be
realized by contracting out custodial services in the state
owned public sector buildings studied. At the state
courthouses cleaning costs ranged from $.67 - 1.01/sf more
than at 250 Freemont. If cost differentials between buildings
could be applied to the renovated Suffolk County Courthouse,
contracting out custodial service alone could generate savings
of between $350,000 and $770,500 annually. 27
27 Total square footage on the New and Old Suffolk County
Courthouses (buildings are connected) is 770,500 based on the
"Ten Year Court Facilities Capital Program," a report published
by DCPO's Court Facilities Unit. Estimated savings were
projected over the building to get the total sum.
30
Additionally, it is a reasonable hypothesis that other
savings are available by subjecting practically all real
estate services to competition. Total operating costs ranged
from $7.71 - 12.77/sf.
TABLE II:
The Data: 1990 Costs per Square Foot
Cat. Description Midsx HOJ McCor Free BOMA
10 Sal/Fees/Exp 1.66 1.60 1.50* 2.48 1.56**
11 Cleaning 2.44 2.64 1.84 1.63 1.31
12 Utilities 2.78 2.09 2.16 2.48 1.98
13 Rep/Maint/Sup 3.43 1.76 1.34 .86 1.88
14 Security 2.14 2.14 .46 .44 .58
15 Insurance .32 .26 .27* .13 .27*
Total 12.77 10.49 7.57 8.02 7.71**
Note: See Appendix C for an explanation of data assembly.
* Estimated costs: McCormack is self-insured. McCormack
Category 10 costs were reported at .92 but were 1.32 only last
year. Therefore, 1.50/sf is used as a reasonable estimate.
BOMA did not break out insurance from its fixed cost category.
** This column does not sum because building types and
quantities differ in each category. The average total
operating cost for 51 buildings is 7.71, which includes .50/sf
added to the reported BOMA cost of 1.06/sf for manag. fees.
DATA DISCUSSION:
SALARIES/FEES/EXPENSES
Salary, fee, and management expense data proved difficult
to compare across buildings and between the public and private
sectors. Normally, this category would include management
salaries, management fees, and office expenses. At 250
Freemont, the $2.48/sf cost included a management fee of
$1.08/sf. Many of the BOMA buildings surveyed did not; a BOMA
research specialist noted that managers are often reluctant to
report fees for large surveys. Subsequently, a $.50/sf
management fee was added to BOMA's reported category 10 cost
of $1.06/sf to estimate for managers not reporting fees. Even
with this addition, BOMA figures remain very competitive
overall with the public buildings.
Another cause for confusion is allocation of personnel
costs. While one building considers a plant engineer a
management expense, for instance, another might charge his/her
salary to maintenance and repair. Similarly, office expenses
get confused with maintenance and repair supplies between the
public and private sector.
State Level
At the state level, a portion of reported salaries are
estimated which adds uncertainty. At Middlesex Superior and
the Hall of Justice 37% and 21% of costs applied to this
category respectively came from the county commissioner's and
treasurer's office for administrative expenses. These costs
were simply a percentage of total office costs - 25% for
Hampden and 21.3% for Middlesex. There was no evidence of a
systematic allocation of cost by time card or job description,
which leads one to presume that the costs charged may be
somewhat arbitrary.
Federal Level
At the McCormack building, wages, salaries, and expenses
were actually reported at $.92/sf. This represents a
substantial drop over the past year due in part to a regional
consolidation. The Boston GSA office, until 1989, was the
central real estate office for New England but is now under
the New York central office, which covers the entire
Northeast. Last year McCormack costs were $1.32/sf and have
not been as low as $.92/sf since 1984.
Private Level
Two components of salary and wage costs at 250 Freemont
are of interest: Management fees are included here along with
rent charges for office space occupied by management within
the building. Similar charges do not appear in either state
or GSA accounting. At 250 Freemont, these expenses made up
48% of category 10. Still, Freemont management operates the
facility with these additional charges included for less than
it costs the state.
With additional research, the data could certainly be
sorted out. But it seems safer and more useful to simply
combine costs for category 10 and 13, wages and salaries plus
repair, maintenance, and supplies to get a lump sum for these
costs which are otherwise poorly allocated between categories.
When combined they appear as follows:
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TABLE III:
1990 Combined Costs per Square Foot for
Category 10 and 13
Midsx HOJ McCor Free BOMA
Sal/Fees/Exp 5.09 3.36 2.84 3.34 3.44
plus Rep/Maint/Sup
The high cost for Middlesex is partly due to an expensive
elevator maintenance contract. Middlesex reported a
$1,008,000 contract for 12 elevators ($84,000/elevator) at the
East Cambridge Superior Court, while Hampden county spent
$17,313 to maintain 5 elevators ($3462/elevator) at the Hall
of Justice. Most likely the Middlesex contract was actually
a capital improvement that should not be included in operating
costs.
The similarity between 250 Freemont and the Hall of
Justice at $3.34 and $3.36/sf respectively leads one to
presume that private sector management fees and salaries can
be afforded in a state contract without increasing the cost
per square foot over that which the state is currently paying.
The BOMA cost in Table III stresses the point that the private
sector seems to maintain and collect management fees on a
multitude of buildings for a cost equal to or less than that
paid by the state.
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UTILITIES:
As shown on Table I, utility costs for all buildings are
similar. Utility rates charged are generally the same for
both public and private sectors. Differentials are probably
a function of fuel selection, preferred comfort zones, and
efficiency as a function of building design.
CLEANING:
State Level
The data indicates that costs are significantly higher
for cleaning services in state owned courthouses. At both the
Hall of Justice in Springfield and the Superior Courthouse in
East Cambridge janitorial crews are comprised of county
employees. Approximately 30% of these workers earn wages that
are 46 - 62% greater than comparable private sector union
wages in downtown Boston. 28
Reasons for these excessive costs are straightforward.
First, work-rules of public sector custodial unions require
that the newest employees are the first to be laid off when
budget problems arise. Because of such rules, custodial crews
evolve naturally into groups of older workers whose salaries
continue to increase with cost of living adjustments. 29
Second, little competitive pressure exists to boost worker
28 See Appendix D for data assembly.
29 Described in an anonymous interview with a Middlesex
County Capital Facilities Project Manager.
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productivity. Public sector managers do not benefit from the
natural incentive for efficiency caused by consolidated,
profit-seeking owners. Available data on custodial earnings
was developed as follows for 1989 and 1990:
TABLE IV:
Number of Custodial Workers Earning from
$10,000 - 29,000 per Year
Midsx 89 HOJ 90 Free 90
over $29,000 1 0 1
$21 - 25,000 15 0 1
$20 - 21,000 0 6 0
$15 - 20,000 12 12 3
$10 - 15,000 6 0 32
Note: Table does not include temporary workers employed at the
Hall of Justice. None of these 19 workers earned more than
$7,000 in 1990. Also, detailed earnings data for 1990 is not
available at Middlesex. See Appendix C for information.
On a more positive note, one manager stated that current
economic conditions are influencing worker efficiency.
Although the political element is always present, "courthouse
workers feel the pressure and understand the situation," the
manager stated, and positions are filled only after
appropriate advertizing and candidate interviews.
Notwithstanding efficiency improvements, however, the cost of
workers at this level will continue to be a potential source
of savings through contracting out.
Federal Level
Custodial services at the McCormack building are
completely contracted out by the GSA to a private company. In
comparison to the privately managed Freemont building several
contract scope differences explain the cost range from $1.63 -
$1.84/sf. First, through the Wagner Oday Act the federal
government uses the McCormack Building as a training facility
for custodial workers with a variety of physical and mental
handicaps. The workers are paid more than the minimum wage
but less than the standard downtown custodial union wage of
between $6.80 and $7.15/hr. Second, cleaning at the federal
building is done during normal working hours, thereby saving
any premium paid for after hours workers. Finally, the actual
cleaning specifications call for fewer cleanings per week and
longer durations between periodic cleanings in comparison to
250 Freemont. Some of these factors add to custodial costs
while others should bring about savings. What is most
relevant is that the federal government is carrying out social
programs to benefit less fortunate workers, maintaining
competition for the right to clean its buildings for a fee,
and doing it for $.60 - .80/sf less than it costs the
Commonwealth.
John S. McNaughten, former GSA Director of Real Estate
for Region One (New England) and current Project Manager for
the new federally owned Fan Pier Courthouse project, is a
strong proponent of GSA contracting practices. As regional
director, McNaughten began contracting for facility services
in 1973. His in-house staff was reduced over the next ten
years from 450 to approximately 80 persons. Shortly after
McNaughten began contracting he noticed a substantial
accumulation of savings. In the late seventies annual
operating costs at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Federal Office
Building in Boston had dropped from $1 million to $600,000.
All of this was attributed to reduced cleaning costs,
McNaughten stated.
At the five year old Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Federal
Building, also in Boston, cleaning costs were only $.98/sf in
1989 and all contracted out. Although further research is
needed to determine the exact scope of this contract, it is
safe to conclude that the federal government spends
significantly less than the Commonwealth for similar custodial
services.
Federal employees at the GSA are quick to point out,
however, that contracting out has not been a panacea for
government. Problems noted by federal contracting specialists
are numerous: Cumbersome regulations cause time delays in
issuing and executing contracts; a multitude of set-aside
programs severely constrict the competitiveness of the bidding
environment; prevailing wage requirements are set by regional
officials who often have insufficient knowledge of local wage
levels, causing expensive differentials between prevailing
requirements and locally acceptable wages; and the bidders
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screening process is often done by Washington officials who
often possess little knowledge of the local contracting
environment. 30 The major difference between federal
contracting and private sector contracting was emphasized by
GSA managers: The government has a broader agenda than simple
economic justification. Social and political factors get
equal attention in its contracting process, and both tend to
inhibit the economic benefits brought about by purely
competitive contracting.
Private Sector
Property managers at 250 Freemont put less emphasis on
social and political issues in contracting for cleaning
services. Although they do educate all building workers on
new public transportation programs in Boston and are involved
in career orientation programs with local schools, Freemont's
managers are primarily interested in the economics of the
contract.
The Freemont cleaning contract is based on the
contractor's cost plus a fee. All wages and benefits to be
paid by Freemont are clearly defined along with exactly what
materials will be either provided by the manager or the
contractor. Scope of work is also made clear in the custodial
request for proposal: The expected levels of cleanliness, the
30 These points were emphasized in an interview with a GSA
contract specialist who wishes to remain anonymous.
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number of times each area is to be cleaned per day, and the
procedure by which the contractor's employees clean each space
is described in detail. In addition, the manager defines the
rates of production expected by the contractor's employees and
routinely monitors actual production and quality levels with
the contractor's manager. Monitoring of performance is done
according to the property manager's defined standards. Copies
of inspection reports are included in the request for
proposals simply to clarify management expectations and
accountability methods.
With GSA specifications the contractor is often required
to develop his own reporting techniques for custodial quality
control and routine mechanical maintenance. Although simpler
for the government in concept, the opportunity for the
contractor to establish reporting procedures can only serve to
loosen the GSA's grip on accountability and performance.
At 250 Freemont, the property manager is willing to take
on the risk of an open ended contract because he\she knows the
productive capacity of competitive contractors and has the
sophistication to accurately monitor contractor performance.
The manager is not committed to involving his/her staff in the
production of service offered to tenants. Management of the
process of high quality product delivery is the central focus.
The average cost in the BOMA survey of $1.31/sf again
emphasizes potential savings by privatizing cleaning services.
Over the 55 buildings for which managers contributed figures,
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$1.31/sf is probably representative of a more realistic
cleaning standard. The difference of $.32/sf below Freemont
is indicative of the high level of service in a Class A
facility, while the difference of $1.13 - 1.33/sf over state
owned facilities is an "incremental" savings that could pay
real dividends if promoted state-wide.
SECURITY:
Security is another area where the state retains the
ability to delivery public service in-house. Only one manager
was questioned about the scope of work represented by the
comparatively high costs of $2.14/sf at both Middlesex
Superior and the Hall of Justice against the other
buildings. At Middlesex Superior, Charles E. Boyle,
Legal Counsel for Middlesex County advised that Court Officers
and Corrections Officers providing courtroom and jail security
at the superior court are not accounted for in court building
expenses sent to the state for reimbursement. The security
costs noted in Table II only cover County Police patrolling
general public spaces - like lobbies, entrances and corridors
and grounds.
The federal courthouse has a contract for security
services in similar public spaces for $.46/sf, 250 Freemont
spends $.44/sf, and BOMA buildings spend $.58/sf on average.
Although additional research is required to confirm scope
differentials and the author fully acknowledges the general
difference between courthouse and office building security, it
would appear savings of at least $1.00/sf could be achieved by
investigating the system further and introducing competition.
DATA SUMMARY:
Scope differential is a serious consideration when
comparing operating costs in buildings with different ages and
functions. Still, there are similarities in the buildings
investigated that allow for meaningful comparisons from which
two reasonable conclusions are generated: First, the state is
spending substantially more for custodial and security
services by using public employees for both production and
management of services. Similar operators in both the public
and private sector pay approximately $2.30 - 2.90/sf less for
these services when the categories are combined. At the
Suffolk County Courthouse, such savings could come to between
$1.5 and $2 million annually over the 770,500 sf facility.
And these savings would be net of management fees paid back to
the private sector through contracting. Second, much more of
the process of service provision is subjected to competition
in the buildings that are less expensive to operate. As the
percentage of services provided through in-house employees
rises, so does the cost. These facts do not seem coincidental
and should warrant additional investigation by advocates
seeking to reduce the cost of government.
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PRIVATE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT FOR COURTHOUSES:
A possible recipe for efficient management of a renovated
court facility is to hire an established private manager with
a fee structure such that there is profit realized to him/her
through competitive contracting, while the state retains the
ability to define and monitor exactly what it wishes to
purchase.
The fee structure could give the private manager a fixed
fee on a square foot basis, supplemented by a majority share
of savings realized through competition. The savings would
have to be calculated from an agreeable operating cost cap
set at the beginning of the management contract. And the cap
would have to be subject to escalations based on cost
increases beyond the control of management such as utility
rates, insurance, and tax increases. Offering private property
managers the opportunity to profit by reducing prices for
services through true competition would be a successful
corralling of the fundamental incentives of consolidated
ownership. Subsequent shared saving could serve both the
private sector and the state.
Another benefit of giving the responsibility for
contracting to the private sector is that social and political
influences can be separated away from the flow of taxpayer
spending for real estate services. For example, it is
acknowledged that set-aside programs do promote minority and
small business interests, but they also cause inefficiencies
by restricting the quantity of qualified bidders for
contracts. Rather than reducing a competitive group of
bidders to only minority owned or small businesses, tax
credits could be offered to contractors employing and training
minorities, or any other group targeted for affirmative
action, at a given percentage of their work force. Through
tax credits, the state can retain a more competitive
environment by contracting more freely and promote social
issues concurrently.
The current bifurcated system in which the DCPO manages
large capital improvement projects on the one hand, while each
state agency, including the judiciary, actually manages its
property on the other seems redundant and hardly competitive.
DCPO already has a strong facilities management staff which
handles many large construction projects and offers management
assistance to agency property managers. It presently serves
as a central link in the network of property managers between
many state agencies. It seems reasonable, then, that DCPO
could take on responsibility for hiring private sector
property managers and monitoring performance within state
owned facilities.
This restructuring could not only add a more competitive
element to courthouse management, but it could address the
problem of deferred maintenance as well. Presently, the state
has a built-in disincentive to properly maintain its real
property: capital improvements are funded by general
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obligation bond issues, for which principal and interest is
paid through DCPO bond funding rather than from agency
budgets. Consequently, agencies like the Office of the Chief
Administrative Justice have a natural tendency to ignore or
defer maintenance, particularly in tight fiscal times, which
eventually turns into a capital improvement to be funded
elsewhere. This system turns annual gutter cleanings into
major roof repairs, and furnace filter changes into furnace
replacements. A system consolidation which retains
demonstrated expertise and consolidates contracting authority
for both capital improvements and property management within




INCREASING PRIVATIZATION OF CAPITAL PROJECTS THROUGH TURNKEY
DEVELOPMENT
This chapter discusses Turnkey development as a form of
privatization that could be applied at the Suffolk County
Courthouse to reduce the procurement time-frame, simplify
public sector problem solving, and reduce total project cost.
The only non-housing Turnkey project approved to date is the
Massachusetts State Track Facility at Northeastern University.
TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT METHODS:
The traditional form of state facility procurement is for
the state to begin with its own parcel of land, select
designers and builders through public bidding, raise funding
through general obligation bonds, and operate the new facility
with in-house management upon completion. There are many
advantages to this established method: It is well understood
by participants, competitors for different roles in the
process are plentiful, the cost of capital is low, and the
state is in control.
Along with ultimate control, however, the state bears the
majority of risk with this traditional method. By hiring
designers it takes ultimate responsibility for cost overruns
and coordination between architect, engineer and builder.
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When the state hires builders and assigns them to a
preselected design team, it must act as coordinator,
moderator, and often peacemaker between these entities.
TURNKEY DEVELOPMENT:
The Turnkey method of development reduces the owner's
interactive responsibilities with the various entities in
procurement by engaging a private developer to assemble the
design, construction, financing, and property management teams
and deliver the finished product with in a budget and time-
frame.
While the state may have to delegate some control over
projects in using turnkey, it gains flexibility in that
municipal employees do not have to be added to the payroll to
execute a project. 31 Additionally, greater private sector
participation can remove the project from political influence
and control and provides insulation for politicians from
responsibility should something go wrong.32 Also, schedule
can be reduced substantially and private sector coordination
of design and construction can lower total project cost.
31 John W. Presle, Finance and Service Alternatives for
Municipalities (Grand Rapids, MI: Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt
& Howlett, 1988), p. 4. This report is an excellent analysis
of pros and cons of traditional procurement, private provision





The concept of value engineering is central to turnkey.
It takes advantage of the developer's experience in
coordinating design and construction and his/her desire to
profit.
The developer naturally has the profit seeking incentive
to produce cost efficient building systems, from HVAC and
electrical distribution through structural frame selection and
building skin assembly. If the developer does not produce an
efficient product, its building will be neither competitive
nor profitable in the market place.
This incentive inherently drives the developer but is
often lacking when the state develops its own facilities. The
state naturally has cost efficiency in mind during
procurement, but the nature of this accountability is
different from the developer's incentive for profit. With the
state, the mission is always to spend as little as possible,
but the strongest incentive is to avoid spending more than
what is considered "normal" or "appropriate." Conversely, the
private developer's primary objective is to bring projects in
for less than the competition so profit margins may be
increased. Harnessing this private sector energy should be
the key objective of turnkey state projects.
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LIMITS OF TURNKEY: NO OWNERSHIP INCENTIVE
The natural problem with turnkey is the ownership
interest. When a developer owns and operates a building for
profit it takes the long term residual property value and
annual operating cost into consideration during value
engineering. The potential for undesirable low residual value
and high operating cost checks the tendency to simplify
construction methods and reduce quality of materials to where
the project is cheap to build but expensive to operate. When
the developer turns a building over to a permanent owner after
construction, his/her "ownership" interest expires with the
building's guarantee, typically after a year. This lack of
long term responsibility tends to play out in the value
engineering process.
John S. McNaughten of the GSA notes this potential as the
greatest risk for government in doing turnkey. Without
disclosing project identities he commented on "more than one"
turnkey building whose floors seemed inadequately flimsy,
systems were expensive to operate, and cladding incapable of
shedding water. "Too often we were sold a sexy box that's
worthless at the end of the lease," stated McNaughten.
Understandably, public officials like McNaughten cannot
afford to be burned repeatedly by any innovative service
delivery technique. But once the purchaser turns away from
turnkey competition, the potential rewards of lower cost with
durable, long lasting quality is lost permanently.
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DEALING WITH SCOPE RISK:
Mitigating the risk of not knowing what is being
purchased in a turnkey project, or scope risk, is achievable
by the public sector. But it requires a level of expertise in
scope definition at least equal to the developer's ability to
capitalize on cost efficient means and methods. As long as
the developer of turnkey projects has the opportunity to
define product scope in proposals, the risk that the purchaser
will get less than it perceives to be paying for will be
significant. Consequently, before a state agency ventures into
turnkey purchasing it is imperative that it builds up an in-
house team of specification writers and inspectors to define
what is needed and to insure that needs are met.
Definition of project scope would be especially important
at Suffolk County as historic renovations traditionally have
a multitude of hidden problems that, for practical purposes,
do not get addressed until the project is underway. Although
much of this renovation risk can be minimized by joint
investigation into such areas as structural soundness, or
exterior wall and roof condition, all parties would need to
agree to a contingency of some magnitude.
OPERATING RISK SIMULATES OWNERSHIP INTEREST:
From an external perspective, it is easy to criticize
purchasers of turnkey development proposals for falling short
in capacity to define project scope. In reality, the
responsibility for specification writing is far more
challenging than it appears in retrospect. Aside from the
fact that it can be onerously tedious, it is doubly
challenging to get everything "right the first time."
To bolster the human element of scope definition, a
purchaser of turnkey development services would be well
advised to align the developer's interests at the proposal
stage as close to those of the ultimate owner as possible.
One such strategy is to require the developer to take on
operational responsibility for routine maintenance and
property upkeep for an extended time period (say five years at
least) after project completion.
As an illustration, the developer as property manager
would be responsible for the maintenance and repair of all
mechanical and electrical components of an HVAC system over a
long term management contract. By giving responsibility to
the developer for components with relatively short economic
life like fans, dampers, motors, coils, and chillers, the
developer is encouraged to rigorously scrutinize a supplier's
proposals which promotes both developer and owner interests.
By defining the role and responsibility of the developer
to be as similar as possible to that of an owner, the state
might avoid having to specify details of the project
infinitum. If interests are parallel, the developer will
propose systems and products with the state's interests in
mind.
TURNKEY FINANCING:
Developer provided financing throughout the turnkey
contract is one of the most attractive elements of the
turnkey. In a typical case, the developer provides short term
financing secured by the state's commitment to purchase the
project upon completion and acceptance. A key feature
distinguishing turnkey from traditional procurement is the
state's lack of financial involvement until project
completion.
When developers carry the finance risk associated with
construction delays or poor quality, their attention to detail
is enhanced. In a traditional project, in which the
independent responsibilities of the owner and architect
directly affect project timing and scope, builders' profits
are determined more by project execution according to plans
and specifications than by schedule. In traditional
procurement it is simply too easy to implicate other parties
when schedule is a problem. With turnkey, the developer's
profits are determined primarily by his/her ability to provide
a product meeting the owner's guidelines in the shortest time
possible.
FINANCE OPTIONS:
In all probability the state would select general
obligation bonds to finance the Suffolk County Courthouse. In
Massachusetts there are few benefits accrued through lease
rental financing on major capital projects. General
obligations offer the lowest cost of funds because they are
secured by the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth.
Although the state currently has the lowest municipal credit
rating in the nation, Moody's Investor Service acknowledges
its "strong legal requirements and administrative powers to
manage cash." 33 Additionally, the credit rating only
provides a benchmark from which other finance vehicles are
risk adjusted upward.
The alternative to general obligation bonds is lease
rental financing. Municipal lease rental financing is a
viable alternative to traditional general obligation bonds but
it is new to the state, no quicker to issue, and provides a
lower cost only when coupled with tax benefits secured through
a "true lease" derived from a sale leaseback. The viability
of such a structure draws serious reservations from tax
experts and is viewed as a "threading of the tax needle." 34
The risk that the cumbersome structure will fail to generate
33 George Leung and Steven Hochman, Moody's Municipal
Credit Report (New York: Moody's Investor Service, 3 June
1991), p. 1. This report rated a $567 million Commonwealth
general obligation bond issue at Baa.
This comment came during a phone interview with a tax
specialist at a local law firm providing bond counsel for the
Commonwealth. The discussion centered on IRS classification of
a lease rental contract between the state and private sector
lessor as a "true lease, " which would allow the project to
take advantage of tax benefits through depreciation and tax
credits (historic only). The problem was the significant risk
that the IRS would not accept the developer as the real owner
and thereby disallow the benefits.
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great savings makes traditional general obligations more
attractive.
BASIC TURNKEY STRUCTURE:
When analyzing the possible privatization of the Suffolk
County Courthouse, the state should consider the following
steps:
1) The state transfers title to the land and courthouse (or
just the courthouse with a nominal lease on the land) to
the developer.
2) The state gives assurances to the developer and the
developer's lender that it will purchase the improved
courthouse upon completion in accordance with state
approved plans and specifications and the state's original
guidelines.
3) In the current market, the developer's lender could be
either a foreign commercial bank providing taxable
financing or tax exempt institution like the Massachusetts
Industrial Finance Authority (MIFA) which issues tax exempt
short term bonds backed by a letter of credit from a
commercial bank that would be drawn upon if the bonds were
not paid at maturity. This could happen if there were
unforseen construction delays or quality problems keeping
the state from accepting the renovated courthouse.
4) The developer builds the project with proceeds from his
commercial lender or tax exempt institution. Upon
completion and during construction the state inspects
project quality to assure guideline compliance. If the
project is delayed, the bond issue letter of credit is
drawn upon to pay bondholders until completion. After
final acceptance the state pays the developer, for the
first time, with proceeds from either a general obligation
bond issue by the state or a lease rental financing. The
lease rental would come in the form of either lease rental
bonds or certificates of participation (COPs).
5) The state subsequently services the obligation annually
by paying interest on the bonds through the state's capital
spending budget or by making lease payments through the
judiciary's annual budget.
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6) In the proposed scenario, the developer commits to
managing the project under a contract as outlined
previously simulating long term ownership interest but
subject to periodic performance measures.
TURNKEY IN MASSACHUSETTS:
Outside of public housing, the Commonwealth's experience
with turnkey purchases is limited to a partially approved
State Track. This experimentation has been slow to develop
due to near obsession in some parts of government with the
thought that graft and corruption might leach back into
procurement. 36 Due to rigid laws passed under Chapter 579
of the Acts of 1980, DCPO must get legislative approval for
every innovative project using either design/build or
turnkey.
But although these requirements can slow the process at
times, the system has developed the checks and balances
required to prudently proceed with progressive techniques.
These procedures are similar to and guided by those
described in a memo to the Governor from the Commissioner of
DCPO on February 6, 1991 which discusses the status of the
State Track Facility.
36 Resistance to new procurement techniques has always
been initiated by products of the Ward Commission that
investigated fraud and abuse in the Bureau of Building
Construction in the late seventies. Findings of the
commission were embodied in Chapter 579 of the Acts of 1980,
which created DCPO to replace the Bureau. Chapter 579 also
created the Office of the Inspector General. Interestingly,
while DCPO has historically been a promoter of new procurement
efforts, the Inspector General has usually opposed anything
other than traditional building procedures.
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In the Northeastern case, for instance, the Design/Build
Selection Board (DBSB) responsible for ranking turnkey
proposals, was "particularly intrigued by the architecture of
one project and almost made the wrong decision by selecting
the most aesthetically attractive proposal which would have
cost an extra $2 million," stated former DCPO Commissioner
John I. Carlson, Jr. Concerned with the pressured environment
in which DBSB was expected to act, the Commissioner used his
ultimate authority to reassess the selection and got support
from the board to change the decision in favor of a less
expensive project that met all specification guidelines.
The level of professionalism demonstrated in this
selection process is indicative of the sober assessment and
rigorous analysis applied by DCPO throughout facility
procurement. For turnkey procurement alone, the agency has a
voluminous manual addressing scope definition, performance
standards, the selection process, and expectations of
accountability for the developer. Although periodically
frustrated with well-intended encumbrances of Chapter 579,
DCPO has the capacity to manage the essentials of
privatization and should act as central coordinator in
contracting out more real estate services.
Given the state's demonstrated ability to manage this
challenging process, turnkey allows the private sector to
independently propose solutions to thorny problems that can
get politically entrenched in public projects. With turnkey,
a developer can take a bundle of issues with which the public
sector typically struggles over a twelve to twenty four month
period, and propose practical solutions in a much shorter
time-frame - six months in Northeastern's case. 37
If there is a shortcoming in the Commonwealth's turnkey
procedures it is that property management is selected
separately from the turnkey contract. At Northeastern the
state intended to purchase the completed facility from the
Beacon Company without retaining the developer's expertise and
interest as property manager. As is widely acknowledged, the
development industry is rapidly evolving into a broader
service industry in which traditionally less emphasized real
estate services are far more valued by the provider. As fee-
based income becomes more essential to a real estate company's
ability to raise capital, property management services play a
more important role in company vitality. The state's decision
to contract out property management at the track is certainly
a step in the right direction in comparison to present court
facility management, but a lack of focus on the incentive
structure of property management contracts and the missed
opportunity to intertwine this function with the developer's




In the right fiscal environment, turnkey can offer real
value by centralizing responsibility for procurement with the
developer. Increased dependence on one private sector party
allows the state to concentrate on its role as facilitator and
solicits private sector solutions to public development
problems often encumbered politically. Furthermore, developer
provided construction financing increases the state's ability
to avoid procurement risk and simplifies bond fund spending
plans for the state. The added pressure carried by the
developer to coordinate design and construction lets the state
take advantage of value engineering expertise and ownership
experience.
But the state cannot assume that a simple turnkey
contract implies that owner developer interests align.
Without true ownership, they naturally do not. A long term
property management contract can minimize the risk to the




As the decline in the real estate industry continues and
development talent becomes surplus, there will be increased
pressure to privatize public facilities. Courthouses in the
Commonwealth offer genuine opportunities for privatization and
the savings available through contracting out. Generally,
these properties have been managed for a long time by the
public sector and it is only natural for inefficiencies to
creep into any management system when the pressures of profit
seeking owners are nonexistent. The honorable mission to
serve the public good is certainly an incentive for
efficiency, but it will always fall short in capacity to
develop innovative techniques to reduce cost when compared to
the profit seeking enterprise.
Not surprisingly, operating costs for courthouses
reviewed were approximately 30-70% higher than costs for
comparable buildings in the private sector. Admittedly,
perfect comparisons are difficult, if not impossible, to
present but with additional research, accounting differences
could be confirmed and cost differences verified. The
greatest potential savings are in the custodial and security
categories, both of which are produced by in-house employees
in the state properties analyzed. These differences
conclusively suggest that there are real savings available
through privatization of the management function through
contracting.
Although the strongest advocates of privatization suggest
that the greatest savings will come from government completely
disengaging from involvement in public service delivery, or
load shedding, this paper has not presumed this extreme to be
applicable to Commonwealth courthouses. Privatization of
courthouses has been limited here to the state's contracting
out as many services as possible from overall capital facility
procurement using turnkey development through property
management.
An increased capacity to contract implies a modified role
for the state in courthouse procurement and management. Scope
definition, management of qualified competitors, and
measurement of performance and accountability must be the
central focus. The DCPO has already demonstrated its capacity
in this regard and should be the focal point of contracting
for all capital projects and property management.
Turnkey development of major projects is a technique that
allows the state to capitalize on private sector innovation
and flexibility. It could be utilized at Suffolk County.
Turnkey can put projects together faster, reduce cost through
value engineering, separate the state from the risks of
coordinating traditional projects, and allow the private
sector to help bring about solutions to political problems
that often arise in public development.
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Whether turnkey is practical today is another issue.
Even if annual savings achieved through private property
management were much greater than the savings estimated in
Chapter II, and turnkey development offered a revolutionary
cost savings from traditional procurement methods, the
probability of proceeding with such a project would still be
low. No matter how great the value, or how ready and willing
the private sector may be to offer competitive services,
capital projects like Suffolk County must be supported by
annual tax revenues. Because a judiciary system cannot stand
on its own, as can a highway supported by tolls, it is
doubtful that a major project at Suffolk County could proceed
before tax revenues begin to rise and the pressure to contain
capital spending subsides. Even if creative municipal lease
financing could be structured as an "end run" around the legal
debt limit, the fiduciary prudence of such a technique is
questionable - no matter how the states provides funds for the
courthouse, it still has to provide them. And since there
does not appear to be a market with a "willingness to pay," as
with a toll road, the state should wait until signs of revenue
improvement materialize before committing to something like
turnkey.
Notwithstanding fiscal problems, the limited potential
for turnkey should not be interpreted as an overall indication
of privatization prospects. Contracting out property
management may be viewed as incremental, but increments of
$1.5 - 2 million per year at any state run facilities like
Suffolk County could add up quickly. And these savings are
net of management fees many fear might consume the bulk of
added value. Furthermore, savings through property management
are available now - there is no need for an improvement in
fiscal conditions and the overcapacity of the real estate
industry in this area is well known. Finally, DCPO has the
expertise to hammer out reasonable deals in which roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined, surprises minimized, and
benefits accrued to all parties.
Increasing public sector sophistication in purchasing and
managing real estate services has been emphasized throughout
the paper. The image of the career bureaucrat must change in
order to speed development of government executive talent.
This fundamental evolution will be at the heart of successful
privatization. Better salaries and working conditions are a
sure way to accomplish this.
But although privatization can mean lower costs of
services to the tax payer and a better regard for more
talented public executives, it is a harsh reality for many.
Even though instituting rehiring programs for public workers
in the private sector can cut away savings on which
privatization would capitalize, the need for worker self-
esteem and a sense of purpose should not be ignored. In many
instances compassion and politics will overpower privatization
logic. But as long as citizens see economic prosperity
passing by a region busting with innovative talent and




Real property assets owned by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts are managed by four independent authorities plus
the state itself. Massport, the Turnpike Authority, the MBTA,
and MWRA all handle such assets as airports and seaports,
roads and bridges, public transportation, and water resource
and recovery. Because these authorities are so independent,
which alone causes capital improvement coordination problems,
their management of assets is not addressed here. This is not
because they are not good candidates for privatization
policies. Indeed, they may offer great potential for taxpayer
savings. The state authorities are simply another topic.
All other public buildings such as schools, mental
hospitals, prisons, and courthouses are owned by the state and
managed through a combined effort of the Department of Capital
Planning and Operations (DCPO) and the state agencies that
occupy and carry out their mandated functions within the
public buildings.
State law requires that user agencies use the expertise
of DCPO to evaluate their needs for renovation or expansion of
existing space, development, and leasing of new space. When
an improvement plan is agreed upon, it is brought to the
legislature for approval and appropriation of funds.
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Upon approval, the DCPO proceeds with procurement of the
project by selecting designers and bidding the project out to
private sector contractors through strictly authorized
procedures.
Upon completion of the project, the new or renovated
facility is turned over to the user agency which both occupies
and manages the building. The DCPO does assist agencies
through its Facilities Management Office to efficiently manage
building operations, but DCPO does not control the property
management function per se in public buildings - this is left
up to user agencies. All operating costs are paid out of
agency budgets with the exception of debt service costs for
capital improvements which are funded by DCPO's "parent"
office, Administration and Finance.
END APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
TABLE I DATA EXPLANATION:
1990 Percentage of Annual Operating Cost in Payroll, Contracts
or Purchases
Percentages were derived by dividing reported in-house

































This Appendix is an explanation of square foot costs
which appear in TABLE II on page 31 for the Middlesex Superior
Court and the Hall of Justice. These costs deserve
explanation because interpretation of the original data was
required before costs could be assemble in the TABLE. Costs
for 250 Freemont, McCormack, and BOMA need no explanation as
they appear in TAble II as reported.
The following are the costs as they appeared in the
"Schedules of Costs to Service Courthouse Facilities." These
costs are submitted by the counties to the state Office of the
Chief Administrative Justice for payment. The counties
provide management for the state in state owned courthouses.
As Reported: Middlesex Superior
1989 Schedule of Costs in 1990 Dollars
Total Costs:
Redist. Midsx Midsx * Infl.Adj. Cost
Category Cnty Tot: Superior: 4.5% per sf
-------------- --------- 
--------------------------
Personnel Costs 10..16 4,487,315 2,653,890 2,773,315 5.72
Employee Benefits 10..16 1,733,572 1,025,270 1,071,407 2.21
Equipment:
Purchased 13,14 107,595 53,711 56,128 0.12
Service Cont 14 26,754 13,356 13,957 0.03
Contractual Serv. 13,14 1,198,562 598,322 625,246 1.29
Rep & Maint/blds 13 114,712 57,264 59,841 0.12
Rep & Maint/land 2,890 1,4643 1,508 0.00
Housekeep Supplies 11,14 79,539 39,706 41,493 0.09
Travel 14 17,563 8,768 9,163 0.02
Insurance 15 298,722 149,122 155,832 0.32
Utilities 12 1,471,243 1,289,581 1,347,612 2.78
Other 10,14 65,102 32,498 33,960 0.07
-------------------------------------------- 
----------------
Superior Total 9,603,569 5,922,931 6,189,463 12.77
As Reported: Hall of Justice















Redist. Hampden Hall *










































Note: excludes capital costs.
and dedt service
* This column is derived
in two way: 1) Any costs
specifically itemized
from the county total
as Middlesex Superior or
Hall of Justice costs
are placed here.




80.56% of any unitemized
costs are charged to HOJ.
The Middlesex multiplier
is 49.92% with a 4.5%
inflator to get 1990
dollars.
HOJ Total 3,160,491 2,379,365 10.49
Personnel costs and employee benefits are the largest
expense for the courts. The costs as provided by the counties
needed to be redistributed across other categories to which
they pertain. The following tables show the actual employee
costs and the new category to which they were assigned for
TABLE II:
Middlesex Superior
Redistribution of Personnel Costs
and Employee Benefits Reported on County
Schedules of Costs
Job Descr. Redist. Annual Benefits * Tot.Cost Infl.Adj Cost
Reported Category Earnings 4.5% per sf
Admin Ass. 10 136,816 52,417 187,233 195,658 0.40
Tel Oper. 10 80,413 31,265 111,678 116,703 0.24
Syst Manag. 10 107,861 41,937 149,798 156,539 0.32
Cnty Empl. 10 189,841 73,810 263,651 275,515 0.57
Temp. Help 10 16,895 0 16,895 17,655 0.04
Janitors 11 714,170 277,671 991,841 1,036,474 2.14
Supervision 11,13,14 148,407 57,701 206,108 215,383 0.44
Foremen 13 166,180 64,611 230,791 241,177 0.50
Pipe Maint. 13 53,350 20,743 74,093 77,427 0.16
Electricians 13 124,013 48,217 172,230 179,980 0.37
Carp/Mason 13 100,733 39,165 139,898 146,194 0.30
Painters 13 95,998 37,324 133,322 139,321 0.29
Vehic Maint. 13 58,463 22,730 81,193 84,847 0.18
Security 14 662,750 257,679 920,429 961,848 1.98
Middlesex Total 2,653,870 1,025,270 3,679,160.3,844,722 7.93
* Benefits calculated by:
Ann.Earn/Tot.Pers.Costs(ex.temp) * Tot.Emp.Benefits
[Annual Earnings/$4,458,7481 * $1,733,572
Hall of Justice
Job Descr. Redist. Annual Benefits Tot.Cost Cost
Reported Category Earnings per sf
Admin Ass. 10 76,292 22,998 99,290 0.44
Tel Oper. 10 68,158 20,546 88,704 0.39
Syst Manag. 10 67,899 20,468 88,367 0.39
Cnty Empl. 10 66,808 8,876 75,684 0.33
Janitors 11 428,746 112,393 541,139 2.39
Supervision 11,13,14 72,920 21,981 94,901 0.42
Mechanics 13 123,988 37,376 161,364 0.71
Carpenters 13 22,880 6,897 29,777 0.13
Painters 13 29,890 9,013 38,903 0.17
Security 14 346,799 104,541 451,340 1.99
-------------------------------------------------------
HOJ Total 1,304,380 365,089 1,669,469 7.36
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Finally, all the costs were redistributed into the
categories appearing in the table. The right hand column
shows the square foot costs actually shown for the state
buildings in TABLE II on page 31:
TABLE II
Redistributed Costs: Middlesex Superior
Personnel/ Purchase/ Total Infl.Adj. Cost
Cat. Description Benefits Contract Expense 4.5% per sf
---- -------------------------------------------------------------





Total 10 729,255 40,236 769,491 804,118 1.66
---- -------------------------------------------------------------
11 Cleaning 991,841 30,311
68,703 39,706
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total 11 1,060,544 70,017 1,130,561 1,181,436 2.44
---- -------------------------------------------------------------
12 Utilities 0 1,289,581
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total 12 0 1,289,581 1,289,581 1,347,612 2.78
---- -------------------------------------------------------------








Total 13 900,230 691,666 1,591,896 1,663,532 3.43
---- -------------------------------------------------------------
14 Security 920,429 3,149
68,702
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total 14 989,131 3,149 992,280 1,036,933 2.14
---- -------------------------------------------------------------
15 Insurance 0 149,122
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total 15 0 149,122 149,122 155,832 0.32
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs 3,679,160 2,243,771 5,922,931 6,189,463 12.77
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TABLE II
Redistributed Costs: Hall of Justice
Personnel/ Purchase/ Total Cost
Cat. Description Benefits Contract Expense per sf





Total 10 352,045 10,977 363,022 1.60





Total 11 572,773 25,482 598,255 2.64
12 Utilities 0 474,681
Total 12 0 474,681 474,681 2.09








Total 13 261,678 137,467 399,145 1.76
14 Security 31,633 313
451,340 1,183
Total 14 482,973 1,496 484,469 2.14
----------------------------------------------------
15 Insurance 0 59,793
Total 15 0 59,793 59,793 0.26




This Appendix explains the wage differential




In the Middlesex County Schedule of Costs, the annual
earnings of forty-eight janitors were itemized as working at
the Superior Court in an Attachment to the Schedule. Sixteen
of the forty-eight janitors (33%) earned over $20,000 in 1989.
Total Earnings for the 16 janitors:
Assuming a 40 hour work week,








At the Hall of Justice, six of twenty-two janitors (27%)
earned over $20,000 in 1990.
Total Earnings for the 6 janitors:
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